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Abstract
In theory the potential for credit risk diversication for banks could be substantial. Portfolios
are large enough that idiosyncratic risk is diversied away leaving exposure to systematic risk.
The potential for portfolio diversication is driven broadly by two characteristics: the degree
to which systematic risk factors are correlated with each other and the degree of dependence
individual rms have to the di¤erent types of risk factors. We propose a model for exploring
these dimensions of credit risk diversication: across industry sectors and across di¤erent coun-
tries or regions. We nd that full rm-level parameter heterogeneity matters a great deal for
capturing di¤erences in simulated credit loss distributions. Imposing homogeneity results in
overly skewed and fat-tailed loss distributions. These di¤erences become more pronounced in
the presence of systematic risk factor shocks: increased parameter heterogeneity greatly reduces
shock sensitivity. Allowing for regional parameter heterogeneity seems to better approximate
the loss distributions generated by the fully heterogeneous model than allowing just for industry
heterogeneity. The regional model also exhibits less shock sensitivity.
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1 Introduction
In theory the potential for credit risk diversication for banks can be considerable. Insofar as
di¤erent industries or sectors are more or less pro-cyclical, banks can alter their lending policy
and capital allocation across those sectors. Similarly, internationally active banks are able to
apply analogous changes across countries. In addition to such passive credit portfolio management,
nancial engineering, using instruments such as credit derivatives, enable banks (and other nancial
institutions) to engage in active credit portfolio management by buying and selling credit risk (or
credit protection) across sectors and countries. Credit exposure to the U.S. chemical industry, say,
can be traded for credit exposure to the Korean steel sector. One may, therefore, think of a global
market for credit exposures where credit risk can be exported and imported.
Within such a global context, default probabilities are driven primarily by how rms are tied
to fundamental risk factors, both domestic and foreign, and how those factors are linked across
countries. In order to implement such a global approach in the analysis of credit risk, we have
developed in Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner (2004), hereafter PSW, a global vector autoregres-
sive macroeconometric model (GVAR) for a set of 25 countries accounting for about 80% of world
output. Importantly, the foreign variables in the GVAR are tailored to match the international
trade pattern of the country under consideration.
Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler and Weiner (2005), hereafter PSTW, relate asset returns for
a portfolio of 119 rms to the global macroeconometric model, thus isolating macro e¤ects from
idiosyncratic shocks as they relate to default (and hence loss). The GVAR e¤ectively serves as the
macroeconomic engine capturing the economic environment faced by an internationally active global
bank. Domestic and foreign macroeconomic variables are allowed to impact each rm di¤erently.
In this way we are able to account for rm-specic heterogeneity in an explicitly interdependent
global context. Developing such a conditional modeling framework is particularly important for
the analysis of the e¤ects of di¤erent types of shock scenarios on credit risk, an important feature
we exploit here.
In this paper we extend the analysis of PSTW along four dimensions. First, we provide some
analytical results on the limits of credit risk diversication. Second, we illustrate the impact of two
di¤erent identication restrictions regarding the default condition on the resulting loss distributions.
Third, we use this framework to understand the degree of diversication with ve models which
di¤er in their degree of parameter heterogeneity, from fully homogeneous to allowing for industry
and regional heterogeneity but homogeneous factor sensitivities all the way to a fully heterogeneous
model. Fourth, we have more than doubled the number of rms in the portfolio from 119 to 243
rms providing for more robust results and allowing us to explore the importance of exposure
granularity. We go on to explore the impact of shocks to real equity prices, interest rates and real
output on the resulting loss distribution as implied by the di¤erent model specications.
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Such conditional analysis using shock scenarios from observable risk factors is not possible
in the most commonly used model in the credit risk literature, namely the Vasicek (1987, 1991,
2002) adaptation of the Merton (1974) default model. In addition to being driven by a single and
unobserved risk factor, this model also assumes that risk factor sensitivities, analogous to CAPM-
style betas, are the same across all rms in all regions and industries, yielding a fully homogeneous
model. This single factor model also underlies the risk-based capital standards in the New Basel
Accord (BCBS (2004)), as shown in Gordy (2003).
We nd that full rm-level parameter heterogeneity matters a great deal for capturing di¤er-
ences in simulated credit loss distributions. Imposing homogeneity results in extremely skewed and
fat-tailed loss distributions. These di¤erences become more pronounced in the presence of system-
atic risk factor shocks: increased parameter heterogeneity greatly reduces shock sensitivity. For
example, an adverse 2:33 shock to U.S. equity prices increases loss volatility by about 31% for
the fully heterogeneous model, but by 73% for the homogeneous pooled model. These di¤erences
become even more pronounced as shocks become more extreme: for an adverse 5 shock to U.S.
equity prices, loss volatility increases by about 85% for the heterogeneous model, but by more than
240% for the restricted model.
We further nd that symmetric shocks result in asymmetric and nonproportional loss outcomes
due to the nonlinearity of the default model. Loss increases arising from adverse shocks are larger
than corresponding loss decreases from benign (but equiprobable) shocks. Here too there are
important di¤erences across model heterogeneity. While all models exhibit this asymmetry for
expected losses and loss volatility, only the fully heterogeneous model maintains this asymmetric
response in the tail of the loss distribution. By imposing homogeneity, not only are the relative loss
responses exaggerated (all the percentage increases and decreases are larger for the restricted than
for the unrestricted model), but perceived reduction of risk in the tail of the loss distribution tends
to be overly optimistic. Failing to properly account for parameter heterogeneity could therefore
result in too much implied risk capital.
Both the baseline and shock-conditional loss distributions seem to change noticeably with the
addition of heterogeneous factor loadings. Allowing for regional heterogeneity appears to be more
important than allowing for industry or sector heterogeneity. However, the biggest marginal change
arises when allowing for full heterogeneity.
The apparently innocuous choice of identifying restriction same default threshold versus same
unconditional probability of default (or distance to default), by credit rating makes a material
di¤erence. Under the same threshold (by rating) restriction, conditioning on risk factor forecasts
changes rm default probabilities only somewhat: unconditional and conditional probabilities of
default are highly correlated (96%). By contrast, such conditioning has a signicant impact under
the same distance to default (by rating) restriction. The conditional default probabilities disperse
resulting in a low correlation with unconditional default probabilities (79%).
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Finally, we are able to assess the impact of granularity or portfolio size on the risk of the
portfolio for a simplied version of the model where analytic solutions for unexpected loss (UL)
are available. The lower the average correlation across rm returns, the greater is the potential for
diversication. But to achieve the theoretical (asymptotic) lower bound to the UL, a relatively large
N is required when return correlations are low. A common rule of thumb for return diversication
of a portfolio of equities is around 50. Default correlations are, of course, much lower than return
correlations, and we show that to come within 3% of the asymptotic UL values, more than 5,000
rms are needed. Thus credit portfolios or credit derivatives such as CDOs which contains rather
fewer number of rms most likely would still retain a signicant degree of idiosyncratic risk. In the
case, for instance, of our more modestly sized portfolio of 243 rms, the UL is some 44% above its
asymptotic value.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a model of rm value and
default. Section 3 covers some useful analytical results for the loss distribution of a credit portfolio.
Section 4 presents the framework for conditional credit risk modeling including a brief overview of
the global macroeconometric model. In Section 5 we introduce the credit portfolio and present the
results from the multi-factor return regressions that link rm returns to the observable systematic
risk factors from the macroeconomic engine. We present results for ve models ranging from the
homogeneous pooled model to one allowing for full heterogeneity, with intermediate specications
that allow for industry and geography e¤ects. In Section 6 we consider how those models impact
the resulting loss distributions under a variety of macroeconomic shock scenarios. In this section we
also consider the impact of portfolio size and granularity on the resulting loss distribution. Some
concluding remarks are provided in Section 7.
2 Firm Value and Default1
Most credit default models have two basic components: (i) a model of the rm value, and (ii)
conditions under which default occurs. In this section we set out such a model by adapting the
option theoretic default model due to Merton (1974) to our global macroeconometric specication
of the systematic factors. Merton recognized that a lender is e¤ectively writing a put option on the
assets of the borrowing rm; owners and owner-managers (i.e. shareholders) hold the call option.
If the value of the rm falls below a certain threshold, the owners will put the rm to the debt-
holders. Thus a rm is expected to default when the value of its assets falls below a threshold value
determined by its liabilities.
The problem of modeling rm default inherits all the asymmetric information and agency prob-
lems between borrower and lender well known in the banking literature. The argument is roughly as
follows. A rm, particularly if it is young and privately held, knows more about its health, quality
1This section follows the approach introduced in PSTW.
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and prospects than outsiders, e.g. lenders. Banks are particularly well suited to help overcome these
informational asymmetries through relationship lending; learning by lending. Moreover, managers
and owners of rms have an incentive to substitute higher risk for lower risk investments as they
are able to receive upside gains (they hold a call option on the rms assets) while lenders are not
(they hold a put option). See the survey by James and Smith (2000) for a more extensive discus-
sion, as well as Garbade (2001). If the rm is public, we have other sources of information such as
quarterly and annual reports which, though accounting based, are then digested and interpreted
by the market. Stock and bond prices serve as summary statistics of that information.
The scope for credit risk diversication thus can manifest itself through two channels: how rm
value reacts to changes in the systematic risk factors and through di¤erentiated default thresholds.
Both channels need to be modeled. Since we shall be concerned with possibilities of diversication
along the dimensions of geography and industry (or sector), we will consider rms j; j = 1; :::; N;
in country or region i; i = 1; :::;M; and sector s; s = 1; :::; S; and denote the rms asset value at
the end of period t by Vjis;t; and its outstanding stock of debt by Djis;t. According to Mertons
model, default occurs at the maturity date of the debt, t + H, when the rms assets, Vjis;t+H ;
are less than the face value of the debt at that time, Djis;t+H . This is in contrast with the rst-
passage model where default would occur the rst time that Vjis;t falls below a default boundary (or
threshold) over the period t to t+H.2 Under both models the default probabilities are computed
with respect to the probability distribution of asset values at the terminal date, t+H in the case
of the original Merton model, and over the period from t to t +H in the case of the rst-passage
models. Although our approach can be adapted to the rst-passage model, for simplicity we follow
the Merton approach here.
We follow the approach developed in detail in PSTW where default is said to occur if the value
of equity, Ejis;t+H ; falls below a possibly small but positive threshold value, Cjis;t+H ;
Ejis;t+H < Cjis;t+H : (1)
This is reasonable since technical default denitions used by banks and bondholders are typically
weaker than outright bankruptcy. Moreover, because bankruptcies are costly and violations to the
absolute priority rule in bankruptcy proceedings are so common, in practice the debtholders have an
incentive to put the rm into receivership even before the equity value of the rm hits the zero value.
The default point could vary over time and with rms particular characteristics (region and sector
being two of them, of course). It is, however, di¢ cult to measure, since observable accounting-based
factors are at best noisy and at worst reported with bias, highlighting the information asymmetry
2See Black and Cox (1976). More recent modeling approaches include direct strategic default considerations
(e.g. Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997)). Leland and Toft (1996) develop a model where default is determined
endogenously, rather than by the imposition of a positive net worth condition. For a review of these models, see, for
example, Lando (2004, Chapter 3).
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between managers (agents) and shareholders and debtholders (principals).3
To overcome these measurement di¢ culties and information asymmetries, we make use of a
rms credit rating R 2 R = fAAA;AA; :::g.4 This will help us specically in nailing down the
default threshold, details of which are given below in Section 2.1. Naturally rating agencies have
access to, and presumably make use of, private information about the rm to arrive at their rm-
specic credit rating, in addition to incorporating public information such as, for instance, nancial
statements and equity returns.
To simplify the exposition here we adopt the standard practice and assume that asset values
follow a Gaussian geometric random walk with a xed drift.
ln (Ejis;t+1=Ejist) = rjis;t+1 = jis + jis"jis;t+1;
where "jis;t+1 v N(0; 1), distributed independently across t (but not necessarily across rms, jis
is the return innovation volatility and jis the drift of the one-period holding return, rjis;t+1. This
specication is unconditional in the sense that it does not allow for the e¤ects of business cycle
and monetary policy variables on returns (and hence defaults). We shall return to conditional asset
return specications that allow for such e¤ects in Section 2.2. The distribution of the H-period
ahead holding period return associated with the above specication is then given by
rjis(t; t+H) =
HX
=1
rjis;t+ v N(Hjis;
p
Hjis); (2)
where the notation (t; t+H) is used throughout to mean over the period from t+ 1 to t+H.
Default then occurs at the end of H periods if the H-period change in rm value (or return)
falls below the log threshold-equity ratio, or return default threshold, as in
ln

Ejis;t+H
Ejis;t

< ln

Cjis;t+H
Ejis;t

;
or
rjis(t; t+H) < jis(t; t+H):
Therefore, using (2), the rms probability of default (PD) at the terminal date t+H is given by
jis(t; t+H) = 
 
jis(t; t+H) Hjis
jis
p
H
!
; (3)
where () is the distribution function of the standard normal variate. The argument of () in
(3) is sometimes called the distance to default (DD). We may rewrite the H-period forward return
default threshold as
jis(t; t+H) = Hjis +
 1 (jis(t; t+H)) jis
p
H:
3Du¢ e and Lando (2001), with this in mind, allow for imperfect information about the rms assets and default
threshold in the context of a rst-passage model.
4For an overview of the rating industry, see Cantor and Packer (1995). For no reason other than convenience, we
shall be using the ratings nomenclature used by Standard & Poors and Fitch.
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where  1 (jis(t; t+H)) is the quantile associated with the default probability jis(t; t+H). The
rm defaults if its H-period return, rjis(t; t +H); falls below its expected H-period return, less a
multiple of its H-period volatility.5
2.1 Identication of the Default Threshold
In this section we provide a brief discussion of the problem of identifying the default threshold for
each rm. Details can be found in Hanson, Pesaran and Schuermann (2005). In what follows we
shall be suppressing the country and sector subscript for simplicity. Suppose now that at time t we
have a portfolio of size Nt of rms, or credit exposures to those rms, and denote the exposure share
or weight for the jth rm as wjt  0 such that
PNt
j=1wjt = 1.
6 At time t the expected portfolio
default rate at the end of H-periods from now (e.g. one year) is then given by
(t; t+H) =
NtX
j=1
wjt 
 
j(t; t+H) Hj
j
p
H
!
: (4)
Relation (4) may be thought of as a moment estimator for the unknown thresholds j(t; t + H),
since j and j and (t; t+H) can be estimated from past observed returns and realized defaults.
With one moment condition and Nt unknown thresholds, one needs to impose Nt   1 identifying
restrictions; for example, one could impose the same threshold for every rm in the portfolio. The
number of required identifying restrictions could be reduced if further information can be used.
One such type of information is provided by credit rating-specic default information.
Although rm-specic default probabilities, j(t; t + H), are not observable, the default rate
by rating, R(t; t+H); can be estimated by pooling historical observations of rmsdefaults in a
particular rating class, using a sample spanning t = 1; :::; T . In this case the number of identifying
restrictions can be reduced to NT   k, where k denotes the number of rating categories, and NT
the number rms in the portfolio at time T . There are two simple ways that identication can be
achieved. One could, for example, impose the same distance to default on all rms in the same
rating category, namely
^j(T; T +H) Hj
j
p
H
= DDR(T; T +H) 8j 2 R; (5)
where ^j(T; T +H) is default threshold estimated on the basis of information available at time T ,
and j and j are sample estimates of (unconditional) mean and standard deviations of one-period
holding returns obtained over the period t = 1; 2; :::; T . Then with estimates of default frequencies
by rating in hand, namely ^R(T; T + H); we are able to obtain an estimate of DDR(T; T + H)
5Note that  1 (jis(t; t+H)) is negative for jis(t; t + H) < 0:5; which covers the default probability values
typically considered in the literature.
6Note that we are disallowing short positions which is not very restrictive for credit assets.
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given by7 dDDR(T; T +H) =  1 (^R(T; T +H)) ; (6)
and hence the rm-specic default thresholds
^j(T; T +H) = j
p
H  1 (^R(T; T +H)) +Hj : (7)
Note that imposing the same DD by rating as in (5) imposes the same unconditional PD for each
R-rated rm, as in (6), but allows for variation in the estimated default thresholds ^j(T; T +H)
across rms within a rating because of di¤erent unconditional means and standard deviations of
returns, as in (7). Note also that each element on the right-hand-side of (7) is horizon dependent,
making the default threshold horizon dependent.
Alternatively, one could impose the restriction that the default threshold ^j(T; T + H) is the
same across rms in the same rating category:
~j(T; T +H) = ^R(T; T +H) 8j 2 R; (8)
which, when substituted into (4), now yields
^R(T; T +H) =
X
j2R
wj;T 
 
^R(T; T +H) Hj
j
p
H
!
: (9)
This is a non-linear equation that needs to be solved numerically for ^R(T; T + H). Condition
(9) implies that DD, and hence unconditional PDs, will vary across rms within a rating, since
^R(T; T+H) is chosen such that on average the PD by rm with rating R is equal to ^R(T; T+H):
2.2 Firm-Specic Conditional Defaults
For the credit risk analysis of di¤erent shock scenarios it is important to distinguish between
conditional and unconditional default probabilities. For the conditional analysis we assume that
conditional on the information available at time t, 
t, and as before the return of rm j in region i
and sector s over the period t to t+H, rjis(t; t+H) = ln (Ejis;t+H=Ejis;t) ; can be decomposed as
rjis(t; t+H) = jis(t; t+H) + jis(t; t+H); (10)
where jis(t; t + H) is the (forecastable) conditional mean (H-step ahead), and jis(t; t + H) is
the (non-forecastable) component of the return process over the period t to t+H. It may contain
rm-specic idiosyncratic as well as systematic risk factor innovations. We shall assume that
jis(t; t+H) s N

0; 2jis(t; t+H)

: (11)
7Condition (5) implies that all rms with rating R have the same unconditional distance to default and hence the
same unconditional default probability, as in (6).
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We can now characterize the separation between a default and a non-default state with an indicator
variable zjis(t; t+H);
zjis(t; t+H) = I [rjis(t; t+H) < jis(t; t+H)] ; (12)
such that,
zjis(t; t+H) = 1 if rjis(t; t+H) < jis(t; t+H) =) Default, (13)
zjis(t; t+H) = 0 if rjis(t; t+H)  jis(t; t+H) =) No Default.
Using the same approach as above, the H-period ahead conditional default probability for rm j
is given by
jis(t; t+H) = 

jis(t; t+H)  jis(t; t+H)
jis(t; t+H)

: (14)
jis(t; t + H) and jis(t; t + H) can be estimated using the rm-specic multi-factor regressions
using a sample ending in period T . In what follows we denote these estimates by ^jis(T; T +H) and
^jis(T; T +H), respectively. The default thresholds, jis(T; T +H), can be estimated, following the
discussion in Section 2.1, by imposing either the same distance to default by rating, DDR(T; T+H);
as in (5), or the same default threshold by rating, as in (8). Specically, under the same DD by
rating, the rm-specic conditional PD will be given by
^jis(T; T +H) = 
 
jis
p
H  1 [^R(T; T +H)] +Hjis   ^jis(T; T +H)
^jis(T; T +H)
!
: (15)
Under the same default threshold by rating we have
^jis(T; T +H) = 
 
^R(T; T +H)  ^jis(T; T +H)
^jis(T; T +H)
!
; (16)
where ^R(T; T +H) is determined by (9).
Similarly, in the case of the same DD by rating the empirical default condition for rm j with
credit rating R can now be written as
I
h
rjis(T; T +H) < ^jis(T; T +H)
i
= 1 if rjis(T; T +H) < jis
p
H  1 [^R(T; T +H)] +Hjis;
(17)
and in the case of the same default threshold by rating the default condition will be
I
h
rjis(T; T +H) < ^R(T; T +H)
i
= 1 if rjis(T; T +H) < ^R(T; T +H); (18)
where as before ^R(T; T +H) is given as the solution to (9). Note that in the case of (18) there
are only as many default thresholds as there are credit ratings, whereas in the case of (17), each
default threshold is rm specic (through jis and jis):
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Mappings from credit ratings to default probabilities are typically obtained using corporate
bond rating histories over many years, often 20 years or more, and thus represent averages across
business cycles. The reason for such long samples is simple: default events for investment grade
rms are quite rare; for example, the annual default probability even for an A rated rm is
approximately one basis point for both Moodys and S&P rated rms (see, for example, Jafry and
Schuermann (2004)). Accordingly, we will make the further indentifying assumption that credit
ratings are "cycle-neutral", in the sense that ratings are assigned only on the basis of rm-specic
information and not on systematic or macroeconomic information. On this interpretation of credit
ratings also see Saunders and Allen (2002) and Amato and Furne (2004).
Given su¢ cient data for a particular region or country i (the U.S. comes to mind) or sector
s, one could in principle consider default probabilities that vary over those dimensions as well.
However, since a particular rm js default is only observable once, multiple (serial) bankruptcies
notwithstanding, it makes less sense to allow  to vary across j.8 Empirically, then, we abstract
from possible variation in default rates across regions and sectors, so that probabilities of default
vary only across credit ratings and over time.
Finally, another important source of heterogeneity that could be of particular concern for our
multi-country analysis is the di¤erences that prevail in bankruptcy laws and regulations across
countries. However, by using rating agency default data, which broadly speaking are based on
homogeneous denition of default, we expect our analysis to be reasonably robust to such hetero-
geneities.
3 Credit Loss Distribution9
The complicated relationship between return correlations and defaults manifest itself at the portfolio
level. Consider a credit portfolio composed of N di¤erent credit assets such as loans at date t, and
for simplicity assume that loss given default (LGD) is 100%, meaning that no recovery is made in
the event of default. Then we may dene loss as a fraction of total exposure by
`N;t+1 =
NX
j=1
wjzj;t+1; (19)
8To be sure, one is not strictly prevented from obtaining rm-specic default probabilities estimates at a given
point in time. The bankruptcy models of Altman (1968), Lennox (1999) and Shumway (2001) are such examples, as
is the industry model by KMV (Kealhofer and Kurbat (2002)). However, all of these studies focus on just one country
at a time (the U.S. and U.K in this list) and do not address the formidable challenges of point in time bankruptcy
forecasting with a multi-country portfolio.
9This section presents a synopsis of results developed in detail in Hanson, Pesaran and Schuermann (2005).
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where wj is the exposure share, where wj  0 and
PN
j=1wj = 1; and zj;t+1 = I(rj;t+1 < jt), with
jt assumed as given.10 Under the Vasicek model
V ar (`N;t+1) = (1  )
0@ NX
j=1
w2j
1A+ (1  )
0@ NX
j 6=j0
wjwj0
1A ;
where  = E (zj;t+1), which is the same for all rms, and  is the default correlation,
 (; ) =
E
h


 1()p
1   
q

1 ft+1
i2  2
(1  ) ; (20)
where expectations are taken with respect to the distribution of ft+1; assumed here to be N(0; 1).11
For example, for  = 0:01, and  = 0:30, we have  = 0:05: Since,
PN
j=1wj = 1, it is easily seen
that
NX
j=1
w2j +
NX
j 6=j0
wjwj0 = 1;
and hence
V ar (`N;t+1) = (1  )
8<: + (1  )
NX
j=1
w2j
9=; : (21)
Under
NX
j=1
w2j ! 0; as N !1; (22)
which is often referred to as the granularity condition, the second term in brackets in (21) become
negligible as N becomes very large, and V ar (`N;t+1) converges to the rst term which will be
non-zero for  6= 0. Hence, in the limit the unexpected loss is bounded by p(1  ). For a
nite value of N , the unexpected loss is minimized by adopting an equal weighted portfolio, with
wj = 1=N . Full diversication is possible only in the extreme case where  = 0 (which is implied
by  = 0), and assuming that the above granularity condition is satised.
The loss distribution associated with this homogeneous model is derived in Vasicek (1991,
2002) and Gordy (2000). Not surprisingly, Vasiceks limiting (as N !1) distribution is also fully
determined in terms of  and . The former parameter sets the expected loss of the portfolio, while
the latter controls the shape of the loss distribution. In e¤ect one parameter, , controls all aspects
of the loss distribution: its volatility, skewness and kurtosis. It would not be possible to calibrate
two Vasicek loss distributions with the same expected and unexpected losses, but with di¤erent
degrees of fat-tailedness, for example.12
10To simplify the notations and without loss of generality, in this section we assume N and the exposure weights
are time invariant.
11For a derivation of (20), see Hanson, Pesaran and Schuermann (2005).
12The literature on modeling correlated defaults has been growing enormously. For a recent survey, see Lando
(2004, ch. 9).
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Further, Vasiceks distribution does not depend on the portfolio weights so long as (22) is
satised. Therefore, for su¢ ciently large portfolios that satisfy the granularity condition, (22), there
is no further scope for credit risk diversication if attention is conned to the homogeneous return
model that underlies Vasiceks loss distribution. Also, Vasiceks set up does not allow conditional
risk modeling where the e¤ects of macroeconomic shocks on credit loss distribution might be of
interest. With these considerations in mind, we allow for systematic factors and heterogeneity
along several dimensions. These are: 1) multiple and observable factors, 2) rm xed e¤ects, 3)
di¤erentiated default thresholds, and 4) di¤erentiated factor sensitivities (analogous to rm betas)
by region, sector or even rm-specic. If the Vasicek model lies at the fully homogeneous end of
the spectrum, the model laid out in Section 2 above describes the fully heterogeneous end. How
much does accounting for heterogeneity matter for credit risk? The outcomes we are interested in
exploring are di¤erent measures of credit risk, be it means or volatilities of credit losses (expected
and unexpected losses in the argot of risk management), as well as quantiles in the tails or value-
at-risk (VaR). Before we are able to answer some of these questions we rst need to introduce the
macroeconomic or systematic risk model that we plan to utilize in our empirical analysis.
4 Conditional Credit Risk Modeling
4.1 The Macroeconomic Engine: GVAR
The conditional loss distribution of a given credit portfolio can be derived by linking up the return
processes of individual rms, initially presented in equation (10), explicitly to the macro and global
variables in the GVAR model. The macroeconomic engine driving the credit risk model is described
in detail in PSW. We only provide a very brief, non-technical overview here. The GVAR is a
global quarterly model estimated over the period 1979Q1-1999Q1 comprising a total of 25 countries
which are grouped into 11 regions, (shown in bold in Table 1 from PSTW, reproduced here for
convenience). The advantage of the GVAR is that it allows for a true multi-country setting;
however, it can become computationally demanding very quickly. For that reason we model the
seven key economies of the U.S., Japan, China, Germany, U.K., France and Italy as regions of their
own while grouping the other 18 countries into four regions.13 The output from these countries
comprises around 80% of world GDP (in 1999).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
In contrast to existing modeling approaches, in the GVAR the use of cointegration is not conned
to a single country or region. By estimating a cointegrating model for each country/region sepa-
rately, the model also allows for endowment and institutional heterogeneities that exist across the
13See PSW, Section 8, for details on cross-country aggregation into regions.
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di¤erent countries. Accordingly, specic vector error-correcting models (VECM) are estimated for
individual countries (or regions) by relating domestic macroeconomic variables such as GDP, ina-
tion, equity prices, money supply, exchange rates and interest rates to corresponding, and therefore
country-specic, foreign variables constructed exclusively to match the international trade pattern
of the country/region under consideration. By making use of specic exogeneity assumptions re-
garding the rest of the worldwith respect to a given domestic or regional economy, the GVAR
makes e¢ cient use of limited amounts of data and presents a consistently-estimated global model
for use in portfolio applications and beyond.14
The GVAR allows for interactions to take place between factors and economies through three
distinct but interrelated channels:
 Contemporaneous dependence of domestic on foreign variables and their lagged values;
 Dependence of country specic variables on observed common global e¤ects such as oil prices;
 Weak cross-sectional dependence of the idiosyncratic shocks.
The individual models are estimated allowing for unit roots and cointegration assuming that
region-specic foreign variables are weakly exogenous, with the exception of the model for the U.S.
economy which is treated as a closed economy model. The U.S. model is linked to the outside world
through exchange rates, which in turn are themselves determined by the rest of the region-specic
models. PSW show that the careful construction of the global variables as weighted averages of the
other regional variables leads to a simultaneous system of regional equations that may be solved
to form a global system. They also provide theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence in
support of the weak exogeneity assumption that allows the region-specic models to be estimated
consistently.
The conditional loss distribution of a given credit portfolio can now be derived by linking up
the return processes of individual rms, initially presented in equation (10), explicitly to the macro
and global variables in the GVAR model. We provide a synopsis of the model developed in full
detail in PSTW.
4.2 Firm Returns Based on Observed Common Factors Linked to GVAR
Here we extend the rm return model by incorporating the full dynamic structure of the systematic
risk factors captured by the GVAR. We present a notationally simplied version of the model
outlined in detail in PSTW. Accordingly, a rms return is assumed to be a function of changes in
14For a more updated version of the GVAR model which covers a longer period and a larger number of countries
see Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran and Smith (2005). This version also provides a theoretical framework where the GVAR
is derived as an approximation to a global unobserved common factor model.
13
the underlying macroeconomic factors (domestic and foreign), the exogenous global variables (in
our application oil prices) and the rm-specic idiosyncratic shocks jis;t+ :
rjis;t+ = jis + 
0
jisft+ + jisjis;t+ ; t = 1; 2; :::; T; (23)
where jis;t+ v i:i:d:N(0; 1),  = 1; 2; :::;H, rjis;t+ is the equity return of rm j (j = 1; :::; nci) in
region i and sector s; jis is a regression constant (or rm alpha), jis are the factor loadings (rm
betas), and ft+ collects all the observed macroeconomic variables plus oil prices in the global
model (totaling 64 in PSW). To be sure, these return regressions are not prediction equations per
se as they depend on contemporaneous variables.
The GVAR model provides forecasts of all the global variables that directly or indirectly a¤ect
the returns. As a result default correlation enters through the shared set of common factors,
ft+ ; and the factor loadings, jis: If the model captures all systematic risk, the idiosyncratic risk
components of any two companies in the model would be uncorrelated, namely the idiosyncratic
risks ought to be cross-sectionally uncorrelated. In practice, of course, it will be hard to absorb all
of the cross-section correlation with the systematic risk factors modeled by the GVAR.
Note that we started by decomposing rm returns into forecastable and non-forcastable com-
ponents in (10), namely rjis(t; t + H) = jis(t; t + H) + jis(t; t + H). In the case of the above
specication we have
rjis(t; t+H) = Hjis + 
0
jis
HX
=1
ft+ + jis
HX
=1
jis;t+ ;
and as an illustration assuming a rst-order vector autoregression for the common factors:
ft+ = f t+ 1 + vt+ ; (24)
we have15
jis(t; t+H) = Hjis + 
0
jis
 
HX
=1

!
ft; (25)
and
jis(t; t+H) = 
0
jis
 
HX
=1
	H vt+
!
+ jis
HX
=1
jis;t+ ; (26)
where
	H  = I++ :::+H  :
The composite innovation jis(t; t+H) contains the idiosyncratic innovation jis;t+ , and common
macro innovations from the GVAR, here represented by vt+ , for  = 1; 2; :::;H. The predictable
component is likely to be weak and will depend on the size of the factor loadings, jis, and the ex-
tent to which the underlying global variables are cointegrating. In the absence of any cointegrating
15Note that for a pure random walk,  = 0; and conditional and unconditional returns processes are identical.
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relations in the global model, none of the asset returns are predictable. As it happens the econo-
metric evidence presented in PSW strongly supports the existence of 36 cointegrating relations in
the 63-equation global model and is, therefore, compatible with some degree of predictability in
asset returns, at least at the quarterly horizon modeled here. The extent to which asset returns
are predicted could reect time-varying risk premia and does not necessarily imply market ine¢ -
ciencies. Our modelling approach provides an operational procedure for relating excess returns of
individual rms to all the observable macro factors in the global economy.
4.3 Expected Loss Due to Default
Given the value change process for rm j, dened by (23), with jis(T; T +H) and jis(T; T +H)
by (25) and (26), and the return default threshold, ^R(T; T +H), obtainable from an initial credit
rating (see Section 2), we are now in a position to compute (conditional) expected loss. Suppose
we have data for rms and systematic factors in the GVAR for a sample period t = 1; :::; T: We
need to dene the expected loss to rm j at time T +H given information available to the lender
(e.g. a bank) at time T; which we assume is given by 
T . Default occurs when the rms return
falls below the return default threshold ^jis(T; T + H) or ~jis(T; T + H) dened by (7) and (8),
depending on the scheme used to identify the thresholds. Expected loss at time T (and realized at
T +H), ET (Ljis;T+H) = E (Ljis;T+H j 
T ) ; is given by (using ~jis(T; T +H) = ^R(T; T +H), for
j 2 R; for example) and
ET (Ljis;T+H) = Pr
h
jis(T; T +H) <
~jis(T; T +H)  jis(T; T +H) j 
T
i
Ajis;TET ('jis;T+H);
(27)
where Ajis;T is the exposure assuming no recoveries (typically the face value of the loan) and is
known at time T; and 'jis;T+H is the percentage of exposure which cannot be recovered in the
event of default or loss given default (LGD). Typically 'jis;T+H is not known at time of default
and is therefore treated as a random variable over the unit interval. In what follows we make the
simplifying assumption that LGD is 100%.
Substituting (23) into (27) we obtain:
ET (Ljis;T+H) = jis(T; T +H)Ajis;T ; (28)
where
jis(T; T +H) = Pr
h
jis(T; T +H) <
~jis(T; T +H)  jis(T; T +H) j 
T
i
:
is the conditional default probability over the period T to T + H, formed at time T . Under the
assumption that the macro and the idiosyncratic shocks are normally distributed and that the
parameter estimates are given, we have the following expression for the probability of default over
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T to T +H formed at T 16
jis(T; T +H) = 
 
~jis(T; T +H)  jis(T; T +H)
jis(T; T +H)
!
; (29)
where jis(T; T + H) =
q
V ar

jis(T; T +H) j 
T

. Exact expressions for jis(t; t + H) and
jis(t; t+H) will depend on the nature of the global model used to identify the macro innovations.
In the case of the illustrative example given above, we have
V ar

jis(T; T +H) j 
T

=  0jis
 
HX
=1
	H 
v	0H 
!
jis +H
2
jis;
where
v is the covariance matrix of the common shocks, vt. The relevant expressions for jis(T; T+
H) and jis(T; T +H) in the case of the GVAR model are provided in the Supplement to PSTW.
The expected loss due to default of a loan (credit) portfolio can now be computed by aggregating
the expected losses across the di¤erent loans. Denoting the loss of a loan portfolio over the period
T to T +H by LT+H we have
ET (LT+H) =
NX
i=0
nciX
j=1
jis(T; T +H)Ajis;T ; (30)
where nci is the number of obligors (which could be zero) in the banks loan portfolio resident in
country/region i.
Finally note that, jis;T is the explained or expected component of rm js return, obtained from
the multi-period GVAR forecasts which in general could depend on macroeconomic shocks world-
wide. Thus, although individual rms operate in a particular country/region i, their probability of
default can be a¤ected by global macro economic conditions.
4.4 Simulation of the Loss Distribution
The expected loss as well as the entire loss distribution can be computed once the GVAR model
parameters, the return process parameters in (23) and the thresholds using either (7) or (8), have
been estimated for a sample of observations t = 1; 2; :::; T . We do this by stochastic simulation
using draws from the joint distribution of the shocks, jis(T; T +H), which is assumed to have a
conditional normal distribution with variance 2jis(T; T +H):
Denote the bth draw of this vector by (b)jis(T; T +H), and compute the H-period rm-specic
return, r(b)ijs(T; T +H), noting that
r
(b)
ijs(T; T +H) = jis(T; T +H) + 
(b)
jis(T; T +H); (31)
16Joint normality is su¢ cient but not necessary for jis(T; T +H) to be approximately normally distributed. This
is because jis(T; T + H) is a linear function of a large number of weakly correlated shocks (63 in our particular
application).
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where jis(T; T +H) is derived from the GVAR forecasts (along the lines of (25)), and

(b)
jis(T; T +H) =  jis;H Z
(b)
0 + jis
p
HZ
(b)
jis (32)
is the composite innovation, where Z(b)0 and Z
(b)
jis are independent draws from N(0; 1). The loading
coe¢ cients  jis;H and jis
p
H are determined by the parameters of the GVAR and the coe¢ cients
of the asset return regressions, (23). In the case of the GVAR model the relevant expressions for
the simulation of the multi-period returns are provided in Section B of the Supplement to PSTW.
Note that Z(b)0 is shared by all rms for a given draw b. Details on the derivation of  jis;H for
the GVAR model can be found in PSTW. The idiosyncratic portion of the innovation is comprised
of the rm specic volatility, jis; estimated using a sample ending in periods T , and a rm specic
standard normal draw, Z(b)jis: One may then simulate the loss at the end of period T + H using
(known) loan face values, Ajis;T , as exposures:
L
(b)
T+H =
NX
i=0
nciX
j=1
I
h
r
(b)
ijs(T; T +H) <
~jis(T; T +H)
i
Ajis;T : (33)
The simulated expected loss due to default is given by (using B replications)
LB;T+H =
1
B
BX
b=1
L
(b)
T+H
p! ET (LT+H) , as B !1: (34)
The simulated loss distribution is given by ordered values of L(b)T+H ; for b = 1; 2; :::; B. For a desired
percentile, for example the 99%, and a given number of replications, say B = 100; 000, credit value
at risk is given as the 1000th highest loss.
5 An Empirical Application
5.1 The Credit Portfolio
To analyze the e¤ects of di¤erent model specications, parameter homogeneity versus heterogeneity,
we construct a ctitious large-corporate loan portfolio. This portfolio is an extended version of that
used in PSTW and is summarized in Table 2a. It contains a total of 243 companies, resident in 21
countries across 10 of the 11 regions in the GVAR model. In order for a rm to enter our sample,
several criteria had to be met. We restricted ourselves to major, publicly traded rms with a credit
rating from either Moodys or S&P. Thus, for example, Chinese companies were not included for
lack of a credit rating. The rms should be represented within the major equity index for that
country. We favored rms for which equity return data was available for the entire sample period,
i.e. going back to 1979. Typically this would exclude large rms such as telephone operators which
in many instances have been privatized only recently, even though they may represent a signicant
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share in their countrys dominant equity index today. The data source is Datastream, and we took
their Total Return Index variable which is a cum dividend return measure.
The third column in Table 2a indicates the inception of the equity series available for the multi-
factor regressions. We allocated exposure roughly by share of output of the region (in our world
of 25 countries). Within a region, loan exposure is randomly assigned. Loss given default is assumed
to be 100% for simplicity. Table 2b provides summary information of the number of rms in the
portfolio by industry.
[Insert Tables 2a & 2b about here]
In order to obtain estimates for the rating-specic default frequencies (^R;T+HjT ), we make use
of the rating histories from Standard & Poors spanning 1981-1999, roughly the same sample period
as is covered by our GVAR model. The results are presented in Table 3 below for the range of ratings
that are represented in our portfolio of rms, namely AAA to B. Empirical default probabilities,
^R;T+ ; for  = 1; 2; :::;H are obtained using default intensity-based estimates detailed in Lando
and Skødeberg (2002) and computed for di¤erent horizons under the assumption that the credit
migrations are governed by a Markov process (in our application H = 4 quarters). This assumption
is reasonable for moderate horizons, up to about two years; see Bangia et al. (2002). Since S&P
rates only a subset of rms (in 1981 S&P rated 1,378 rms of which about 98% were U.S. domiciled;
by early 1999 this had risen to 4,910, about 68% U.S.), it is reasonable to assign a non-zero (albeit
very small) probability of default, even if the empirical estimate is zero. This is particularly relevant
if we wish to infer default behavior for a much broader set of rms than is covered by the rating
agencies. With this in mind, we impose a lower bound on the quarterly default frequency of 0.025
basis points per quarter or 0.1 basis points per annum. As can be seen in Table 3, this constraint is
binding only for the AAA rating. In this table we also show in parentheses the exposure share by
rating and the resulting EL. Based on the exposures in our portfolio, the (unconditional) expected
default (or loss under the maintained assumption of no recovery) over one year is 0.294% or 29.4bp
(basis points), bolded in the table.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
5.2 Multi-factor Return Regressions: Specication, Estimation and Selection
With the GVAR framework serving as the global economic engine, multi-factor return regressions
are specied in terms of the observed macro factors in the GVAR model. A general form of these
return regressions is given by (23). Given the diverse nature of the rms in our portfolio, one
is tempted to include all the domestic, foreign and global factors (i.e. oil price changes) in the
multi-factor regressions. Such a general specication may be particularly important in the case
where a multinational is resident in one country, but the bulk of its operations takes place in the
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global arena. However, because there is likely to be a high degree of correlation between some of the
domestic and foreign variables (in particular the domestic and foreign real equity prices), it is by no
means obvious that a general-to-specic model selection process would be appropriate, particularly
considering the short time series data available relative to the number of di¤erent factors in the
GVAR.
An alternative model selection strategy, which we adopted in PSTW and follow in this paper,
is to view the 243 multi-factor regressions as forming a panel data model with heterogeneous
coe¢ cients. Such panels have been studied by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran, Smith and
Im (1996) where it is shown that instead of considering rm-specic estimates one could base the
analysis on the means of the estimated coe¢ cients, referred to as the mean group estimates (MGE).
This approach assumes that the variations of factor loadings across rms in di¤erent regions are
approximately randomly distributed around xed means. This is the standard random coe¢ cient
model introduced into the panel literature by Swamy (1970) and used extensively in the empirical
literature.17 The choice of the factors in the multi-factor regressions can now be based on the
statistical signicance of the (population) mean coe¢ cients by using the MGE to select a slimmed-
down regressor set.18
The above factor selection procedure applied to the panel of 243 rms led to the following set
of factors: changes in domestic or foreign real equity prices, which we denote by ~qi;t+1, domestic
interest rate (i;t+1) and oil price changes (p
o
t+1). We ran two sets of multi-factor regressions
(including the interest rate and oil price variables); one with qi;t+1 (the domestic aggregate
equity return variable) and another with qit (the foreign country-specic equity return variable),
and selected the regression with the higher R2. For three-quarters of the portfolio (183 rms) the
domestic equity market return was chosen. This fully heterogeneous return equation (to be denoted
as model M0) is given by
rjis;t+1 = jis + 1;jis~qi;t+1 + 2;jisi;t+1 + 3;jisp
o
t+1 + "jis;t+1; (35)
where the idiosyncratic errors, "jis;t+1; are assumed to be i:i:d:N(0; 2jis). As credit rating informa-
tion is used, default thresholds are computed using (7) and (8), depending on whether we x DD
or  by rating.
The summary of the nal set of multi-factor regressions of (35) and the associated MG estimates
are given in Table 4. In this specication changes in equity prices, interest rates and oil prices remain
the key driving factors in the multi-factor regressions.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
As is to be expected, the portfolio equity betais highly signicant, but somewhat below unity
at 0.918. An increase in the rate of interest results in a decline in rm returns while the overall e¤ect
17A recent review of the random coe¢ cient models is provided by Hsiao and Pesaran (2004).
18The appropriate test statistics for this purpose are given in PSTW, Section 6.
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of the oil price changes is positive. This seems a reasonable outcome for energy and petrochemical
companies and for some of the banks, although one would not expect this result to be universal. In
fact we do observe considerable variations in the individual estimates of the coe¢ cients of oil prices
changes across di¤erent rms in our portfolio. In the nal regressions, of the 243 rm regressions,
the coe¢ cient on oil price changes was positive for 144 rms (about 59% of the total), and negative
for the remaining rms. The MGE for each subset was also signicant. A pooled estimate would,
of course, impose the same factor loadings, in this case positive, on all rms.19
The lack of other observable systematic risk factors entering the return model conrms that
most information relevant for rm returns is contained in the contemporaneous market return.
Only interest rates and oil prices changes provided marginal explanatory power. To be sure, when
forecasting the macroeconomic variables, and when conducting scenario analyses, the dynamics
of all the variables modeled in the GVAR (all 63 of them, plus oil prices) can still a¤ect returns
through their possible impacts on equity returns and interest rates. A direct presence in the rm
return equation is not necessary for real output, for example, to inuence returns. Output shocks
inuence returns and credit losses to the extent that real output, interest rates and stock market
returns are contemporaneously correlated.
In addition to the above fully heterogeneous specication, we also consider a number of spec-
ications with di¤ering degrees of slope and error variance heterogeneity, but based on the same
three systematic factors (~qi;t+1;i;t+1;p
o
t+1): We consider the following additional models:
M1(Fully Homogeneous Model): Pooled return equations with the same alphaand beta
across all 243 rms in the portfolio:
rjis;t+1 = + 1~qi;t+1 + 2i;t+1 + 3p
o
t+1 + "jis;t+1; (36)
where the error variances are assumed to be the same for all rms, i.e. 2jis = 
2
" 8 jis.20
M2 (Firm Fixed E¤ects): This is the standard xed e¤ects specication:
rjis;t+1 = jis + 1~qi;t+1 + 2i;t+1 + 3p
o
t+1 + "jis;t+1; (37)
where the error variances are assumed to be the same for all rms, as in the model M1.
M3: (Industry/Sector Fixed and Marginal E¤ects): This model imposes the same in-
tercept (alphas) and slopes (betas) within an industry/sector but allows those parameters to
vary across industries:
rjis;t+1 =
SX
s=1
sSDs +
SX
s=1
1sSDs~qi;t+1 +
SX
s=1
2sSDsi;t+1 (38)
+
SX
s=1
3sSDsp
o
t+1 + "jis;t+1;
19Similarly for i;t+1; 38% of rms actually have a positive coe¢ cient.
20The parameters  and 0i are estimated by pooled OLS.
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where SDs is a sector dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for sector s and 0 otherwise, for
all t, i and j. All rms within a given sector have the same error variance, but those variances are
allowed to vary across industries.
M4: (Region Fixed and Marginal E¤ects): In this model we impose the same intercept
(alpha) and slope (beta) within a region but allow those parameters to vary across regions.
rjis;t+1 =
MX
i=1
iRDi +
MX
i=1
1iRDi~qi;t+1 +
MX
i=1
2iRDii;t+1 (39)
+
MX
i=1
3iRDip
o
t+1 + jis;t+1;
where RDi is dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for region i and 0 otherwise, for all t, s
and j. All rms within a given region have the same error variance, but those variances are allowed
to vary across regions.
Model M2 is arguably the simplest complication beyond a fully homogeneous model in that
it allows rm xed e¤ects (rm alphas) but still imposes the same error variance on all rms.
Models M3 and M4 explore the impact of parameter (mean and variance) heterogeneity by industry
and region respectively.
Table 5 summarizes the regression results for the remaining models, M1 to M4. The equity
factor loading is highly statistically signicant (1% or better) across all models, and for the pooled
models, with or without a rm xed e¤ect, M2 (0.869) and M1 (0.865) respectively, the coe¢ cient is
close to the MG estimate for the heterogeneous model, M0 (0.918). There is, however, considerable
variation across industries (M3) and regions (M4). For the industry model, the equity beta
is lowest for Communication, Electric & Gas and Non-durable Manufacturing, both 0.752, and
highest for FIRE (Finance, Insurance and Real Estate), 0.909. The sector equity betaclosest to
the pooled model is Agriculture, Mining & Construction, 0.889.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
There is even more variation in the equity betaacross regions, ranging from a low of 0.622 for
Latin America to a high of 1.926 for the Middle East, represented in our portfolio simply by four
Turkish rms and so should not be taken as typical.21 The second lowest betawas estimated
for Italy, 0.663, and the second highest for neighboring Germany, 1.165. Evidently geographic
proximity does not translate to similarity in equity betas, at least not for our portfolio. South East
Asia is closest to the pooled betaat 0.842.
Turning now to interest rate sensitivity, recall that the MGE of the interest rate variable for the
heterogeneous model is -2.990, meaning an increase in interest rates has an adverse e¤ect on rm
21The Middle East region did not include a domestic equity variable, so all return equations for the Turkish rms
include the foreign equity return variable, qi;t+1, for i = Turkey.
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returns. This coe¢ cient is not signicant for either of the pooled models, M1 and M2, and it has the
wrong sign. Allowing for variation across sectors, M3, results in signicant and negative coe¢ cients
for FIRE, -5.590, and Wholesale & Retail Trade, -3.711. Just one of the positive coe¢ cients is
signicant: 3.402 for Non-durable Manufacturing. Similar results are obtained in the case of Model
M4, where the interest rate variable is statistically signicant with a correct sign only in case of
US rms (-5.974), the Turkish rms in the Mid East region (-6.676), and South East Asia (-5.454).
Only one of the positive estimates is statistically signicant, although it is small, and that is for
Latin America, 0.111.
The coe¢ cient on oil price changes is signicant and positive for both pooled models, M1 (0.063)
and M2 (0.064), echoing the MGE for the heterogeneous model M0 (0.145). Recall, however, that
the MGE of the sub-groups with positive and negative coe¢ cients were also signicant, suggesting
that rm-level heterogeneity for this factor loading may be particularly important. When group-
ing by industry or region, however, only the positive coe¢ cients are signicant. Indeed, in the
indeustry/sector model, the coe¢ cient of the oil price variable is signicant only for Communica-
tion, Electric & Gas, at 0.113. In the regional model it is signicant for several regions, including
the U.S. (0.076), Germany (0.230), Mid East (2.341), which is not surprising, and Latin America
(1.035), although the oil exporter Venezuela is not part of our Latin American region.
From a model t perspective, as measured by R2, regional heterogeneity is more important
than industry heterogeneity: R2 = 0:171 for the former and 0:151 for the latter. Both are preferred
to just adding rm xed e¤ects to the pooled model: the R2 for M2 is 0:148. By comparison, the
average R2 for the heterogeneous model M0 is 0.201; see Table 4.
Finally, we computed the average pair-wise cross-sectional return correlation across all rms
in our portfolio as well as of the residuals for each of the return specications, M0 through M4.
The average pair-wise cross-sectional return correlation turns out to be about 11.2%. While this
may seem low for equity returns, note rst that returns are measured at relatively low frequency
quarterly, and second that our portfolio is quite well diversied, with rms from 21 countries
grouped into 10 regions, and across all major industry groups. The three factors used in the ve
model specications are able to absorb a signicant amount of the cross-rm dependence: the
average residual correlation ranges from 3.7% to 4% across the models.
Another consideration in our comparative analysis is the extent to which the ve alternative
parametric specications a¤ect cross section correlations of the simulated returns. Since all the ve
models are based on the same set of observed factors, cross section correlations of the simulated
returns will be a¤ected signicantly by parameter heterogeneity only if the di¤erences of parameters
across rms are systematic. In the case of pure random di¤erences across slopes, it is easily seen
that all specications would imply similar degrees of error cross correlations, and this is in fact true
in the present application.
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6 Simulated Credit Loss Distributions
6.1 Unconditional and Conditional Loss
With the estimated GVAR model serving as the macroeconomic scenario generator and the tted
multi-factor regressions as the linkage between rms and the global economy, we simulated loss
distributions one year ahead. We do this by rst forecasting, out-of-sample, the evolution of
the 64 GVAR risk factors, using those forecasts and the risk factor loadings or return regression
coe¢ cients to compute rm return forecasts, and then seeing if that return forecast falls below the
default threshold. A one year horizon is typical for credit risk management and thus of particular
interest. We carried out 200,000 replications for each scenario, baseline as well as shock scenarios,
using Gaussian innovations.
The estimation period ends in 1999Q1, and we generate the loss distribution out of sample over
one year to the end of 2000Q1. The year over which the loss distribution is simulated turned out
to have been relatively benign for the rms in our portfolio when compared to the sample period
which we use to compute unconditional parameters such as expected returns and return volatilities.
The unconditional one-year portfolio return (i.e. the exposure weighted average return of all rms
in the portfolio) is 14.67%, whilst using the specication for the fully heterogeneous model M0;
the conditional portfolio return projected for the forecast year is 37.78%. This is reected in the
di¤erence between conditional and unconditional portfolio default (the same as expected loss, EL,
under the maintained assumption of no loss recovery). Recall from Table 3 that unconditional EL
is 0.294%, but conditional EL under the default threshold () identifying assumption (8) is 0.096%,
and under the same distance to default (DD) assumption (5) is 0.089%.22 When we compare
the analytical to the simulated conditional portfolio default or expected loss, they are very close:
0.096% for same  and 0.087% for same DD.
Fixing DD to be the same across rms by rating also xes the unconditional default probability;
the two are isomorphic. Conditioning on return forecasts updates those probabilities. Fixing
the default threshold  by rating, however, allows for heterogeneity in the unconditional default
probabilities; they just need to be the same on average (see the discussion in Section 2.2). Those,
in turn, may be updated over time as conditioning information is incorporated. This rm-level
heterogeneity in unconditional probabilities of default (PD) can make a big di¤erence empirically,
as is seen in Figure 1 which displays a scatter plot of unconditional (horizontal axis) and conditional
(vertical axis) one-year PDs for the 243 rms in the portfolio. The top panel is for the same default
threshold () by credit rating for all rms, while the bottom panel is for the same distance to default
(DD) by credit rating for all rms. The axes on both charts are scaled to be directly comparable.
We see immediately in the top panel that conditional and unconditional PDs are not only widely
22The di¤erences between the latter two estimates are due to rounding error arising from the inverse normal
transform on very small probabilities.
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dispersed, reective of the underlying rm level heterogeneity, but also highly correlated ( = 0:961).
By contrast the sameDD by rating chart (bottom panel) has both the unconditional and conditional
PDs tightly clustered in a narrow range. As there are six credit ratings represented in this study,
so we see six vertical lines, where the vertical scatter represents the variation in conditional PD by
rating (all having the same unconditional PD, of course) resulting in a lower correlation between
unconditional and conditional PDs ( = 0:790). In contrast to same ; the PDs implied by same
DD change dramatically through conditioning. (or updating). These di¤erences will become more
explicit and pronounced in the loss distributions across the model specications, an issue we address
next.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
6.2 Model Heterogeneity and Baseline Losses
In moving from the most homogeneous model M1 to M2, we add heterogeneity in the conditional
mean by allowing for rm xed e¤ects, as well as heterogeneity in the unconditional probability of
default, namely by introducing credit rating information. To isolate the e¤ects of these relaxations
of the homogeneity restrictions, we add an intermediate model which augment model M1 with credit
rating information. Consequently we denote M1a to be the homogeneous model without the use of
rating information, and M1b the homogeneous model that allows for credit ratings in determination
of the default thresholds.
Table 6 gives summary statistics for the baseline (i.e. no risk factor shocks) loss distribution
for all models, with the top panel imposing the same threshold, ; identifying restriction, and the
bottom panel the same distance to default, DD, restriction. We show the rst four moments as
well as three tail quantiles or values-at-risk (VaR): 99.0%, 99.5% and 99.9%, corresponding to levels
commonly used by risk managers, and in the last case, the risk tolerance level of the New Basel
Capital Accord (BCBS (2004)).
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Looking rst at the top panel, EL and UL vary signicantly across the di¤erent specications,
both increasing as we increase model heterogeneity. However, as shown in Hanson , Pesaran and
Schuermann (2005), it is important that the di¤erences in ELs across the di¤erent portfolios are
taken into account, before implications of heterogeneity for unexpected losses can be evaluated.
There is no obvious way that this can be done. Here we normalize risk, whether measured by
unexpected loss (UL) or VaR, by EL. We shall refer to these as EL multiples.
The results in Table 6 show that it takes about 21 EL multiples to obtain one standard deviation
of losses for the most homogeneous model M1a, just 11 for the industry model M3, and only 2.5
for the fully heterogeneous model M0. The third and fourth moments, skewness and kurtosis
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respectively, also decline when more heterogeneity is allowed for. Imposing homogeneity results in
overly skewed and fat-tailed loss distributions. This point becomes quite clear when looking at the
99.9% VaR: model M1a and M1b have EL multiples in excess of 300, while the regional model M4
has a multiple of only 54 and the fully heterogeneous model M0 only 21, less than one-tenth of the
most homogeneous model.
Adding credit ratings to the homogeneous specication, model M1b; results in noticeable drop
in EL multiples: UL/EL drops from 20.8 to 17.1, and 99.9% VaR from 382 to 305. Adding rm
xed e¤ects, model M2, does not help; in fact risk seems to increase slightly. We need to allow
for variation in factor loadings, either by industry, model M3, or region, model M4, before EL
multiples decline further. A similar pattern holds when looking at value at risk. In this regard
regional heterogeneity seems to play a more important role than industry heterogeneity, perhaps
not surprising given the international nature of this portfolio.23
Turning to the bottom panel, where the loss distributions are simulated under the same DD
identifying restriction, di¤erences across model specications are much more muted. The results
for the heterogeneous model M0 are broadly in line with its same  counterpart in the top panel
(EL and UL, and VaR are similar). However, EL decreases as we increase the degree of parameter
heterogeneity. Moreover, there is little di¤erence in EL multiples, whether looking at loss volatility
(UL) or VaR. In fact, the results would suggest that increased heterogeneity actually increases risk:
UL/EL for M1a is 1.4 and for M0 is 3.0. Further, 99.9% VaR, normalized by EL, is 11 for M1a and
28 for M0. In light of these results, and the previous discussion of unconditional and conditional
PDs, in the remaining analysis we focus on the same threshold () identifying restriction.
Before proceeding to the shock scenarios, it may be of interest to compare the simulated UL
to that implied by the Vasicek model as discussed in Section 3. This asymptotic expression, given
in (21), is driven by the average default rate across the portfolio, ; and the default correlation,
; itself a function of  and the average return correlation of the rms in the portfolio, ; which
is 11.2% for our portfolio; see (20) in Section 3. Thus using the unconditional portfolio default
rate from Table 3,  = 0:294%, this yields a default correlation of  = 0:470% and an asymptotic
UL =
p
(1  ) = 0:371%, which is above the simulated UL of all models. However, those
simulated ULs are conditional, not unconditional, and if we substitute the simulated (conditional)
EL (which, under the maintained assumption of no loss recovery, is identical to ); all asymptotic
UL values are below their simulated counterparts, as they should be, assuming that the average
return correlation  remains unchanged. For example, in the case of model M0,  = 0:094%; so
that  = 0:208% . In that case asymptotic UL = 0:140% which is below the simulated UL of
0.239%. The di¤erence is clearly due to granularity, an issue we pick up in Section 6.5 below.
23We tried a di¤erent industry specication using 10 instead of 6 groups to match the number of parameters in the
regional model (there are 10 regions). This did not change our conclusions.
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[Insert Figure 2 about here]
In Figure 2 we compare the simulated loss distributions across model specications. The top
panel displays the 20% tail (80th percentile and beyond) and the bottom panel focuses on the 5%
tail. The extreme skewness and fat-tailedness of the more restricted models becomes apparent.
We see that the fully heterogeneous model in particular accumulates losses much earlier in the
distribution, already by about the 82nd percentile, than the other models. Signicant losses are not
seen until about the 95th percentile for the regional model M4, not until after the 97th percentile
for the industry model M3, and well beyond the 99th percentile for all other models.
6.3 Model Heterogeneity and Risk Factor Shocks
One of the main advantages of our conditional modeling approach is that it allows us to consider
the impact of di¤erent macroeconomic or risk factor shock scenarios. The ability to conduct shock
scenario analysis with observable risk factors is clearly important for policy analysis, be it business
or public policy.
Recall that the risk factors in the rm return models are equity returns, interest rates and
oil prices. In addition we shall explore the impact of business cycle heterogeneity across di¤erent
countries by considering shocks to real output, which (as noted earlier) can inuence the loss
distributions indirectly through their contemporaneous correlations with equity returns and interest
rates. Accordingly we examined the following equiprobable scenarios, though others are possible,
of course:24
 a 2:33 shock to real U.S. equity, corresponding to a quarterly change of 14.28% from the
baseline forecast,25
 a +2:33 shock to the German short term interest rate, corresponding to a quarterly rise of
0.33%,
 a  2:33 shock to real U.S. output, corresponding to a quarterly drop of 1.85%.
In order to learn more about the tail properties of the various loss distributions, we also consider
an extreme stress scenario for the U.S. equity market as reported in PSTW, namely an adverse
shock of 8:02. This corresponds to a quarterly drop of 49% which is the largest quarterly drop in
the S&P 500 index since 1928, and that occurred over the three months to May of 1932. Finally,
we include an intermediate negative equity shock of  5 which corresponds to a quarterly decline
242.33 corresponds, in the Gaussian case, to the 99% Value-at-Risk (VaR), a typical benchmark in risk manage-
ment.
25Relative to historic averages, this shock corresponds to a rise (drop) of 17.95% (11.35%), computed as
exp (2:23% 14:28%)  1:
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of 30.64%. Details of how the macroeconomic shocks are generated and how they feed through rm
returns to the loss distribution can be found in PSTW.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
We start the discussion with a 2:33 shock to real U.S. equity under the same threshold,
; restriction, summarized in Table 7. For each model we repeat the baseline results for ease of
comparison and display the percentage increase (decrease) from that baseline of EL, UL and 99.9%
VaR. For each model, the percentage increase in EL and UL arising from the adverse shock is
always larger than the corresponding decline in losses due to a benign shock. Consider model M1a:
EL (UL) increases by 88% (73%) under the adverse shock and decreases by 67% (48%) under the
benign shock. The size of those impacts declines as we allow for more heterogeneity. The regional
model M4, for instance, shows an increase in EL (UL) of 151% (42%) from the adverse shock
against a decline of 46% (29%) from the benign shock. The smallest impact can be seen from the
most heterogeneous model, M0: the adverse shock increases EL (UL) by 51% (31%) and the benign
shock decreases EL (UL) by 31% (21%).
This asymmetric and non-proportional response of credit losses to symmetric shocks is due
to the nonlinearity of the credit risk model. When going to the tails of the loss distribution,
however, only the fully heterogeneous model M0 maintains this asymmetric response. For all other
model specications, the reduction in 99.9% VaR arising from the benign shock is larger than the
corresponding increase in 99.9% VaR due to the adverse shock. Thus, by imposing homogeneity,
not only are the relative loss responses exaggerated (all the percentage increases and decreases are
larger for the restricted than for the unrestricted model), but perceived reduction in risk in the tail
of the loss distribution tends to be overly optimistic.
Finally, note that an adverse shock results in less skewed and fat-tailed loss distributions, relative
to their respective baselines, across all models, and conversely a benign shock renders them more
extreme. The adverse (benign) shock results in more (fewer) rms defaulting systematically due
to the displacement of expected (i.e. forecast) returns, before any additional idiosyncratic risk is
accounted for. As a result an adverse (benign) shock shifts probability mass of the loss distribution
closer to (farther from) the mean. The e¤ects of the shocks on the shape of the loss distribution is
quite large for relatively homogeneous models, and much more modest for heterogeneous ones. For
instance, the skewness (kurtosis) for M1a decreases to 19.4 (537) under the adverse shock compared
to the baseline, 29.4 (1200), but increases to 38.0 (1652) under the benign shock. By contrast, the
skewness and kurtosis decreases to 5.1 and 37, respectively, for the regional model, M4; under the
adverse shock scenario as compared to the baseline values of 6.5 and 56, but increases to 8.4 and
86 under the benign shock scenario, respectively. The relative impact is, of course, even smaller for
the fully heterogeneous model, M0.
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The evidence thus far suggests that heterogeneity is important in controlling risk both under
a baseline forecast and under shock scenarios. Allowing for regional heterogeneity appears to be
more important than allowing for industry or sector heterogeneity. Both the baseline and shock-
conditional loss distributions seem to change noticeably with the addition of heterogeneous factor
loadings, i.e. starting with model M3. However, the biggest marginal change arises when allowing
for full heterogeneity with model M0.
Next we consider an adverse shock to German interest rates. Naturally we could have shocked
interest rates of other countries, e.g. the U.S., but since we already have other U.S.-based shock
scenarios, we wanted to broaden the discussion by considering shocks to other countriesmacroeco-
nomic factors. Interest rate shocks are of particular interest in our modeling context because the
corresponding factor loading is positive, but insignicant, for the pooled models M1 and M2, on
average negative and signicant for the heterogeneous model M0, and rather mixed for the industry
and regional models, M3 and M4.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
The loss simulation results are summarized in Table 8. Compared with adverse U.S. equity
shocks, the impact on credit losses due to an equiprobable adverse shock to German interest rates
is more modest. EL increases on average by only about 24%, UL by only 12%, and 99.9% VaR by
around 5%. Here too we see a similar model ranking as before, with the most homogeneous model
M1a being the most shock sensitive, at least when measured by EL and UL impact, and the most
heterogeneous model M0 the least shock sensitive. The impact on on 99.9% VaR is modest across all
models, and given parameter uncertainty, broadly similar across the di¤erent model specications.
Even though the factor loading on interest rates is positive, albeit small and not signicant,
for the pooled models M1a, M1b and M2, losses still increase in reaction to an adverse interest rate
shock. Because of the complicated inter-dependencies that exist in the GVAR model, shocking
one of the factors will potentially impact all the other 62 factors. As a result the overall e¤ect of
the shock on the loss distribution need not have the same sign as the coe¢ cient of the factor in
the return equation. Consequently an adverse interest rate shock may have the counter-intuitive
benign direct e¤ect on rm returns in the pooled return regressions, but the intuitive adverse
indirect e¤ects through the equity return factor.
With this in mind we consider the e¤ects of an adverse shock to real U.S. output. Recall that
output does not enter the rm return regressions; however, shocks in output may enter indirectly
through the other variables such as interest rates and equity prices. We summarize those results
in Table 9 and notice immediately that the changes from the baseline are of the wrong sign but
quite small and are unlikely to be statistically signicant. One year after the shock, credit losses
are projected to actually decline somewhat. Average decline in EL across models is about 5%, the
decline in UL is about 3%, and the decline in 99.9% VaR about 2% relative to the baseline loss
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distribution. In Section 6.4 below we explore whether including output directly in the rm-specic
return regressions makes any di¤erence.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Finally, we consider the e¤ect of extreme shocks to the resulting distribution of credit losses
under di¤erent model specications. Table 10 presents results from two di¤erent U.S. real equity
shock scenarios:  5:00 in Panel A and  8:02 in Panel B, the latter matching the largest quarterly
drop in the S&P 500 index since 1928. To be sure, a shock as extreme as  8:02 is, of course,
outside the bounds of the estimated model. It would be unreasonable to believe that such a large
shock would not result in changes to the underlying parameters. However, it is still instructive to
examine the impact of an extreme shock, one way one might stress a credit risk model. Moreover,
5 events are more common at higher frequencies than the quarterly data we have available to us,
and in this way our results will likely underestimate the true loss outcomes.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
Under the  5 shock scenario, shown in Panel A, increases in expected losses across models
range from eleven-fold (1035%) (M2) to nine-fold (794%) (M1a) to just 154% (M0). UL increases
for the same models are about three and a half-fold for M1a (244%) and M2 (266%) and not quite
double for M0 (85%). Di¤erences in the tail impact at the 99.9% level are not as extreme: 150%
for M1a, 107% for M2 and 83% for M0. But the broad pattern observed so far holds: the more
restrictive (homogeneous) the model, the more sensitive it reacts to shock scenarios.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
As the shock becomes more extreme to  8:02; see Panel B in Table 10, the resulting loss
distribution for all models becomes less skewed and fat-tailed, as measured by kurtosis. To see
this graphically we generated density plots for model M0; presented in Figure 3. In the top panel
we display the simulated loss densities for model M0 for the baseline, the symmetric and two
severe shocks to U.S. real equity prices. To make it easier to see some of the features of the
shock-conditional distributions, the positive shock density is not shown in the bottom panel.
6.4 Business Cycle Shocks: An Alternative Model Specication
The return regressions used in the above simulation exercises do not select the real output growth
as a risk factor. As noted earlier this might not be that surprising as the e¤ects of business
cycle uctuations on rm returns could have already been incorporated indirectly through market
returns. It is, however, possible that the factor selection and the subsequent model estimation
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could have been biased due to the use of country-specic asset return variables, particularly in the
case of countries with relatively small asset markets.26
With this in mind, and following the work of Kapetanios and Pesaran (2004), we proceeded
to estimate an alternative version of the fully heterogeneous model which includes a global equity
return, qt+1, dened as the cross-sectional average of all equity indices in the GVAR model
instead of the country-specic market returns, ~qi;t+1 used in (35). We then run this version of
the return regression augmented with real output growth for region i, denoted by yi;t+1; and the
other variables, namely changes in interest rates (i;t+1) and oil prices (p
o
t+1):
27
rjis;t+1 = jis + 1;jisqt+1 + 2;jisi;t+1 + 3;jisp
o
t+1 + 4;jisyi;t+1 + jis;t+1: (40)
The MGE results for the alternative specication (40) using PPP weights are given in Table 11.
These new estimates attribute a smaller e¤ect to market returns with the average market beta
falling from 0.918 to 0.780 and the interest rate e¤ects rising (in absolute value) from -2.99 to -4.236.
The average e¤ect of real output growth on rm returns is also statistically signicant and has the
correct sign, which contrasts the earlier results based on country-specic equity market returns.
The average e¤ects of oil price changes, although still positive, are no longer statistically signicant.
The change in the estimates as a result of using qt+1 instead of ~qi;t+1 are in line with a priori
expectations and could be explained by a positive correlation between the country-specic market
returns and the errors in the rm-specic return regressions. This is also reected in the estimates
of the in-sample t of the return regressions where the avg. R2 declines from 0.201 to 0.103 as we
move from ~qi;t+1 to qt+1. The decline in the t is quite substantial and could be an important
consideration in the choice between the alternative specications, although any simultaneity arising
from inclusion of ~qi;t+1 could in itself result in an upward bias in the avg. R2.
[Insert Table 11 about here]
Bearing in mind the uncertainty associated with these alternative specications, the loss simu-
lations based on the new return regressions for the baseline scenario as well as for the 2.33 shock
scenarios are summarized in Table 12. These simulations can be viewed as providing a check on the
robustness of the loss simulation results obtained so far. Baseline loss behavior is only somewhat
di¤erent from M0 (see last row of Table 6, top panel), but importantly it is closer than any of the
26Recall that the estimates of the output e¤ects are obtained by regression of rm-specic returns on the market
returns, output growth and other variables such as changes in the interest rates and oil prices. Since market returns
are in e¤ect weighted averages of the rm-specic returns, the return regressions could yield biased estimates if the
market return happens to be based on a relatively few rms.
27This cross-sectional average may be either equal weighted or PPP-weighted. We experimented with both. In the
latter case we used PPP weights from 1996, the same weights used in the GVAR to construct regions from countries.
There were little di¤erences in the result, and in what follows we focus on the estimates based on the PPP-weighted
global real equity index.
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other restricted models, even though their in-sample goodness of t was higher. When we examine
the impact of shocks, even though real output now directly enters the rm return regressions, the
impact of an adverse shock to real U.S. output growth is very similar to the previous specication:
it is both small and of the wrong sign. Meanwhile the impact of the other shocks are similar in this
as in the original specication.
[Insert Table 12 about here]
Although the average loading on output is positive, statistically signicant and large at 0.7, it
turns out that about half (45%) of the rms actually have a negative coe¢ cient (loading) on output.
Indeed when we look at the MGE of the positive and negative subsets, they are both signicant.
Hence it is not surprising that for our portfolio, the net impact of an adverse shock to output is
about zero. Of course, if the portfolio were comprised only of rms with a positive loading, credit
losses would likely increase in the event of an adverse output shock.
As far as loss distributions are concerned, our overall conclusions seem to be robust to the choice
of the rm-specic return regressions.
6.5 Idiosyncratic Risk and Granularity
Portfolio-level results of credit risk models such as those discussed in Vasicek (1987, 2002) assume
that the portfolio is su¢ ciently large that all idiosyncratic risk has been diversied away. More
generally we consider a credit portfolio composed ofN di¤erent credit assets such as loans, each with
exposures or weights wi, for i = 1; 2; ::; N , such that the granularity condition (22) holds. Recall
that a su¢ cient condition for (22) to hold is given by wi = O
 
N 1

.28 The lower the average rm
return correlation, the greater the potential for diversication, but a larger N is required to attain
that limit than if correlations are lower. A common rule of thumb for return diversication of a
portfolio of equities is N  50: But as seen in Section 6.2, default correlations are much lower than
return correlations, meaning that more rms are needed to reach the diversication limits of credit
risk.
Thus it seems reasonable to ask if a portfolio of N = 243 is large enough to diversify away the
idiosyncratic risk. To answer this question we used an empirical version of the one-factor Vasicek
model described in Section 3 and analyzed the impact of increasing N on simulated compared to
analytic (asymptotic) unexpected loss (UL). For simulation purposes, Vasiceks model takes the
following form:
rj;t+1 = r + f ft+1 + ""j;t+1; (41)
28Conditions (22) on the portfolio weights was in fact embodied in the initial proposal of the New Basel Accord
in the form of the Granularity Adjustments which was designed to mitigate the e¤ects of signicant single-borrower
concentrations on the credit loss distribution. See Basel Committee (2001, Ch.8).
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where r =
PT
t=1
PN
j=1 rjt=NT ,  
"j;t+1
ft+1
!
s i:i:d:N (0; I2) ;
I2 is a 2-dimensional identity matrix,  = 2f=

2f + 
2
"

; and 2f is the variance of the market
return. These parameters can be estimated as
^2f =
PT
t=1(rt   r)2
T   1 ; rt =
NX
j=1
rjt=N; (42)
and
^2" =
PT
t=1
PN
j=1 (rjt   rt)2
NT   2 : (43)
Loss is given by (19) with the return default threshold given by
 = r +
q
2f + 
2
" 
 1 () : (44)
For our portfolio, for the one-year horizon we have the following parameter values: r = 13:356%;
^f = 11:230%; ^" = 34:856%; ^ = 0:294%, so that the implied average return correlation  =
9:404%, with an associated default correlation of  = 0:369%.29 Substituting these values in (44)
obtains a one-year return default threshold of  87:51%, meaning that any rm that experiences a
one-year return worse than  87:51% would default.
Calibrating the Vasiceks model to these parameters we simulated losses assuming di¤erent
portfolio granularity, ranging from 119 to 10,000 rms. To be sure, all rms share the same draw of
the systematic factor f and the same default threshold lambda, while each rm carries idiosyncratic
risk (reected by rm-specic draws from "j;t+1 v N(0; 1)). Idiosyncratic risk should diversify
away, with the simulated UL approaching the analytic UL as the number of rms increases.
The results are summarized in Table 13. The result for N = 119 relates to the number of rms
in the PSTW portfolio. By more than doubling N we cut idiosyncratic risk nearly in half. But to
come within 3% of the asymptotic UL of the portfolio, more than 5,000 rms are needed! Thus
credit portfolios or credit derivatives such as CDOs which contains rather fewer number of rms
will likely still retain a signicant degree of idiosyncratic risk, an observation also made by Amato
and Remolona (2004).
[Insert Table 13 about here]
29The relationship between  and  is given by (20).
32
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have made use of a conditional credit risk model with observable risk factors,
developed in Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler and Weiner (2004), to explore several dimensions of
credit risk diversication: across industries (sectors) and across di¤erent countries or regions, either
in a relatively restrictive xed e¤ects return specications, or by allowing for full rm-level hetero-
geneity. Specically, we x the number of risk factors there are three: market equity returns and
changes in domestic interest rates and oil prices and only vary the degree of parameter hetero-
geneity across models. We nd that full rm-level parameter heterogeneity matters a great deal for
capturing di¤erences in simulated credit loss distributions. Expected loss (EL) increases as more
heterogeneity is allow for. However, unexpected losses, normalized by EL, decline dramatically.
Moreover, imposing homogeneity results in overly skewed and fat-tailed loss distributions.
These di¤erences become more pronounced in the presence of shocks to systematic risk factors.
The most restricted model which imposes the same factor sensitivities across all rms is overly
sensitive to such shocks, and thus failing to properly account for parameter heterogeneity could
result in too much implied risk capital. Allowing for regional parameter heterogeneity seems to
better approximate the loss distributions generated by the fully heterogeneous model than allowing
just for industry heterogeneity.
The results raise a number of questions and issues that merit further exploration. Our portfolio,
by virtue of being allocated across 21 countries in 10 regions, is already quite diversied as evidenced
by an average cross-sectional pair-wise return correlation of 11.2%. Concentrating all of the nominal
exposure into just one region or one industry would undoubtedly have signicant impact on the
resulting loss distribution, in addition to yielding di¤erences across models. A di¢ culty one would
quickly encounter in exploring this problem are the rating or default probability di¤erences across
those dimensions. The average rating in the U.K., for instance, is much higher than for the
Latin American obligors, especially if one follows the rule that an obligor rating cannot exceed
the sovereign rating.30
It is also worth exploring the impact of fat-tailed innovations on the resulting loss distributions.
The current application is limited to the double-Gaussian assumption (both idiosyncratic and
systematic innovations are normal), but it seems reasonable to relax this assumption by considering,
say, draws from Student-t distributions with low degrees of freedom.
30This rule seems quite reasonable when one considers debt denominated in, say, USD (or euros), but perhaps less
so if the debt is exclusively in the local currency.
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Table 1  
Countries/Regions in the GVAR Model 
 
U.K. Germany Italy France 
Western Europe 
 Belgium 
 Netherlands 
 Spain 
 Switzerland 
South East Asia 
 Indonesia 
 Korea 
 Malaysia 
 Philippines 
 Singapore 
 Thailand 
Latin America 
 Argentina 
 Brazil 
 Chile 
 Mexico 
 Peru 
 
Middle East 
 Kuwait 
 Saudi Arabia 
 Turkey 
 
U.S.A. Japan China  
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Table 2a  
The Composition of the Sample Portfolio by Regions 
 
Region # of 
Obligors 
Equity Series1 
Quarterly 
Credit Rating2 
Range 
Portfolio 
Exposure (%) 
U.S.A. 
U.K. 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
W. Europe 
Middle East 
S.E. Asia 
Japan 
L. America 
63 
24 
21 
14 
10 
24 
4 
34 
35 
14 
79Q1 – 99Q1 
79Q1 – 99Q1 
79Q1 – 99Q1 
79Q1 – 99Q1 
79Q1 – 99Q1 
79Q1 – 99Q1 
90Q3 – 99Q1 
89Q3 – 99Q1 
79Q1 – 99Q1 
89Q3 – 99Q1 
AAA to BBB- 
AA to BBB+ 
AAA to BBB- 
AA to BBB 
A to BBB- 
AAA to BBB+ 
B- 
A to B 
AAA to B+ 
A to B- 
20 
8 
10 
8 
8 
11 
2 
14 
14 
5 
Total 243 – – 100 
 
1. Equity prices of companies in emerging markets are not available over the full sample period used for the 
estimation horizon of the GVAR. We have a complete series for all firms only for the U.S., U.K., Germany 
and Japan. For France, Italy and W. Europe, although some of the series go back through 1979Q1, data are 
available for all firms from 1987Q4 (France), 1987Q4 (Italy), 1989Q3 (W. Europe). For these regions the 
estimation of the multi-factor regressions are based on the available samples. For Latin America we have 
observations for all firms from 1990Q2. 
2. The sample contains a mix of Moody’s and S&P ratings, although S&P rating nomenclature is used for 
convenience. 
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Table 2b  
Portfolio Breakdown by Industry 
 
 #  (%) of Firms 
Agriculture, Mining & Construction 
Communication, Electric & Gas 
Durable Manufacturing 
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 
Non-Durable Manufacturing 
Service 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 
24 (9.9%) 
45 (18.4%) 
30 (12.3%) 
71 (29.2%) 
27 (11.1%) 
6 (2.5%) 
40 (16.4%) 
Total 243 (100%) 
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Table 3  
Unconditional Default Probabilities by Rating 
 
1, 2, 3 & 4 quarter ahead (in basis points), exposure weighted in parentheses 
S&P Rating Exposure 
Share 
( ), 4ˆR T Tπ +  
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
BB 
B 
4.8% 
17.6% 
32.5% 
27.7% 
11.6% 
5.8% 
0.100 (0.005) 
0.372 (0.066) 
0.721 (0.234) 
10.69 (2.97) 
49.54 (5.72) 
353.61 (20.42) 
Portfolio 100% 29.42 
 
Based on ratings histories from S&P, 1981Q1 - 1999Q1 
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Table 4 
Mean Group Estimates of Factor Loadings, Heterogeneous Model (M0) 
 
Factors MGE 
βˆ  
S.E. of MGE 
( )ˆ. .s e β  
t-ratios 
constant 
, 1i tq +∆ %  
, 1i tρ +∆  
1
o
tp +∆  
0.022 
0.918 
-2.990 
0.145 
0.002 
0.026 
0.528 
0.042 
10.495 
34.862 
-5.663 
3.456 
avg. 
2R  
avg. 
2R  
# of firm quarters 
0.238 
0.201 
17,114 
  
 
, 1i tq +∆ %  is equal to , 1i tq +∆  (domestic equity return) or , 1
*
i t
q
+
∆  (foreign equity return), depending on 
which yields a better in-sample fit. , 1i tρ +∆  is the change in the domestic interest rate, and 1
o
tp +∆  is 
the change in oil prices. 
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Table 5: Return Regression Results for Models M1 - M4 
 
 M3:Industry Fixed & Marginal Effects 
 
 M4:Region Fixed & Marginal Effects 
 
 M1: 
Pooled 
M2: 
Pooled  + 
Firm FE 
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Constant 0.020*** 
(0.001) 
 0.022*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.015***
(0.004) 
0.023*** 
(0.003) 
0.030***
(0.004)
0.028***
(0.008) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.032*** 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.027*** 
(0.006) 
0.026*** 
(0.004) 
0.156*** 
(0.014) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.076*** 
(0.007) 
Equity 0.869*** 
(0.016) 
0.865*** 
(0.016) 
0.752*** 
(0.081) 
0.889*** 
(0.051) 
0.834***
(0.044) 
0.909*** 
(0.028) 
0.752***
(0.055)
0.775***
(0.122) 
0.944*** 
(0.045) 
0.916*** 
(0.039) 
0.801*** 
(0.065) 
1.165*** 
(0.064) 
1.097*** 
(0.067) 
0.663*** 
(0.059) 
0.808*** 
(0.056) 
1.926*** 
(0.242) 
0.842*** 
(0.036) 
0.904*** 
(0.044) 
0.622*** 
(0.045) 
Interest 
rate 
0.018 
(0.050) 
0.031 
(0.050) 
-0.020 
(0.081) 
0.115 
(0.106) 
0.124 
(0.082) 
-5.590*** 
(0.573) 
3.402**
(1.515)
-2.717 
(3.480) 
-3.711*** 
(1.316) 
-5.974*** 
(0.907) 
0.669 
(1.366) 
0.699 
(3.061) 
-1.016 
(2.414) 
-0.576 
(2.961) 
-2.493 
(2.288) 
-6.676*** 
(0.840) 
-5.454*** 
(0.824) 
-0.885 
(2.072) 
0.111** 
(0.050) 
Oil price 0.063*** 
(0.021) 
0.064*** 
(0.020) 
0.113** 
(0.049) 
0.067 
(0.065) 
0.059 
(0.057) 
0.175*** 
(0.040) 
0.012 
(0.059)
0.058 
(0.124) 
-0.006 
(0.048) 
0.076** 
(0.038) 
0.058 
(0.061) 
0.230*** 
(0.067) 
0.023 
(0.085) 
-0.004 
(0.104) 
-0.117 
(0.067) 
2.341*** 
(0.241) 
0.047 
(0.066) 
0.009 
(0.053) 
1.035*** 
(0.125) 
R2 0.144 0.160 0.152       0.173          
2R  0.144 0.148 0.151       0.171          
# Firm 
Quarters 
17,114 17,114 2,989 1,689 2,178 4,546 2,099 474 3,139 4,977 1,896 1,622 1,030 674 1,634 156 1,799 2,765 561 
() indicates the standard error of the parameter estimate 
* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level 
Firm return regressions using quarterly returns for 243 firms from 21 countries grouped into 10 regions.  More detail on the equity return data 
series by region is contained in Table 2a.  Systematic risk factors are market equity return, “Equity,” the change in the domestic (short) interest 
rate, “Interest rate,” and the change in the (global) price of oil, “Oil price.”  The factor selection process and details on the return specifications 
for models M1 to M4 are given in Section 5.2.  
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Table 6 
Baseline Scenario 
Statistics of Simulated Losses for Models M0 - M4, One Year Ahead 
Same λ      Value-at-Risk (VaR/EL) 
Model Specifications EL UL UL/EL Skewness Kurtosis 99.0% 99.5% 99.9% 
M1a Homogeneous - No Rating 0.001% 0.030% 20.8 29.4 1200 0%  (0) 0%  (0) 0.56%  (382) 
M1b Homogeneous - w/ Rating 0.002% 0.035% 17.1 22.1 633 0%  (0) 0%  (0) 0.62%  (305) 
M2 Firm fixed effects (σ2) 0.002% 0.030% 19.4 23.9 691 0%  (0) 0%  (0) 0.59%  (377) 
M3 Industry (σ2s) 0.006% 0.062% 10.7 12.9 194 0.15%  (26) 0.53%  (92) 0.88%  (153) 
M4 Regional (σ2i) 0.023% 0.120% 5.2 6.5 56 0.63%  (27) 0.85%  (37) 1.25%  (54) 
M0 Heterogeneous (σ2jis) 0.094% 0.239% 2.5 3.6 24 1.06%  (11) 1.33%  (14) 1.93%  (21) 
Same DD      Value-at-Risk (VaR/EL) 
Model Specifications EL UL UL/EL Skewness Kurtosis 99.0% 99.5% 99.9% 
M1a Homogeneous - No Rating 0.644% 0.905% 1.4 2.9 19 4.16%  (6) 5.07%  (8) 7.31%  (11) 
M1b Homogeneous - w/ Rating 0.150% 0.363% 2.4 4.3 36 1.63%  (11) 2.08%  (14) 3.27%  (22) 
M2 Firm fixed effects (σ2) 0.131% 0.324% 2.5 4.3 36 1.47% (11) 1.84%  (14) 2.91%  (22) 
M3 Industry (σ2s) 0.146% 0.358% 2.5 4.2 34 1.63% (11) 2.06%  (14) 3.16%  (22) 
M4 Regional (σ2i) 0.152% 0.358% 2.4 3.8 27 1.62% (11) 2.01%  (13) 2.96%  (19) 
M0 Heterogeneous (σ2jis) 0.086% 0.259% 3.0 5.4 58 1.18% (14) 1.52%  (18) 2.43%  (28) 
 
Simulated one year ahead loss distributions for all return model specifications using 200,000 simulations.  Details on the return specifications for 
models M0 to M4 are given in Section 5.2.  Table compares two alternative identification restrictions: top panel imposes the same return default 
threshold, λ, by rating when rating information is used (this is the case for all models except M1a), while bottom panel imposes the same distance to 
default, DD, by rating when rating information is used. 
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Table 7 
±2.33σ Shock to U.S. Real Equity Returns 
Statistics of Simulated Losses for Models M0 - M4, One Year Ahead, Same λ 
         Value-at-Risk 
Model Specifications  EL 
% EL to 
Baseline UL 
% UL to 
Baseline Skewness Kurtosis 99.0% 99.5% 
99.9%  
(%∆ to Baseline)
M1a Homogeneous - No Rating - 2.33 σ 0.004% 172% 0.052% 73% 19.4 537 0% 0.38% 0.74%  (33%) 
   Baseline 0.001% 0.030%  29.4 1200 0% 0% 0.56% 
   + 2.33 σ 0.0005% -67% 0.016% -48% 38.0 1652 0% 0% 0.12%  (-78%) 
M1b Homogeneous - No Rating - 2.33 σ 0.007% 221% 0.066% 88% 13.9 279 0.25% 0.56% 0.88%  (41%) 
   Baseline 0.002% 0.035%  22.1 633 0% 0% 0.635% 
    + 2.33 σ 0.0007% -68% 0.019% -45% 36.7 1673 0% 0% 0.30%  (-52%) 
M2 Firm fixed effects (σ2) - 2.33 σ 0.005% 228% 0.056% 87% 14.3 259 0.15% 0.44% 0.83%  (41%) 
   Baseline 0.002% 0.030%  23.9 691 0% 0% 0.59% 
    + 2.33 σ 0.0005% -69% 0.016% -46% 39.0 1704 0% 0% 0.16%  (-73%) 
M3 Industry (σ2s) - 2.33 σ 0.014% 151% 0.102% 65% 9.0 108 0.62% 0.83% 1.08%  (23%) 
   Baseline 0.006% 0.062%  12.9 194 0% 0.53% 0.88% 
    + 2.33 σ 0.002% -61% 0.037% -40% 19.0 400 0% 0% 0.67%  (-24%) 
M4 Regional (σ2i) - 2.33 σ 0.043% 88% 0.171% 42% 5.1 37 0.85% 1.00% 1.50%  (20%) 
   Baseline 0.023% 0.120%  6.5 56 0.63% 0.85% 1.25% 
    + 2.33 σ 0.012% -46% 0.085% -29% 8.4 86 0.50% 0.59% 0.87%  (-30%) 
M0 Heterogeneous (σ2jis) - 2.33 σ 0.142% 51% 0.314% 31% 3.4 21 1.41% 1.73% 2.55%  (32%) 
   Baseline 0.094% 0.239%  3.6 24 1.06% 1.33% 1.94% 
    + 2.33 σ 0.065% -31% 0.189% -21% 3.9 26 0.89% 1.00% 1.52%  (-21%) 
 
Simulated one year ahead loss distributions for all return model specifications imposing symmetric shocks to U.S. market equity returns. 200,000 
simulations are used, and the same return default threshold, λ, by rating when rating information is used (this is the case for all models except M1a) is 
imposed. 
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Table 8 
+2.33σ Shock to German Interest Rates: Quarterly Increase of 0.33% 
Statistics of Simulated Losses for Models M0 - M4, One Year Ahead, same λ  
        Value-at-Risk 
Model Specifications EL 
%∆ EL to 
Baseline UL 
% ∆ UL to 
Baseline Skewness Kurtosis 99.0% 99.5% 
99.9%  
(%∆ to Baseline)
M1a Homogeneous - No Rating 0.002% 39% 0.036% 20% 26.2 980 0% 0% 0.58%  (5%)
M1b Homogeneous - w/ Rating 0.003% 32% 0.041% 16% 19.7 511 0% 0.180% 0.65%  (4%)
M2 Firm fixed effects (σ2) 0.002% 28% 0.034% 13% 20.8 520 0% 0% 0.59%  (1%)
M3 Industry ( σ2s) 0.007% 22% 0.068% 10% 11.7 164 0.33% 0.56% 0.88%  (<1%)
M4 Regional (σ2i) 0.026% 15% 0.130% 8% 6.2 51 0.77% 0.85% 1.34%  (7%)
M0 Heterogeneous (σ2jis) 0.10% 8% 0.25% 5% 3.6 23 1.11% 1.40% 2.04  (5%)
 
Simulated one year ahead loss distributions for all return model specifications imposing an adverse shock to the German short maturity interest rate. 
200,000 simulations are used, and the same return default threshold, λ, by rating when rating information is used (this is the case for all models except 
M1a) is imposed. 
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Table 9 
-2.33σ Shock to U.S. Real Output: Quarterly Decline of 1.85% 
Statistics of Simulated Losses for Models M0 - M4, One Year Ahead, same λ 
 
        Value-at-Risk 
Model Specifications EL 
%∆ EL to 
Baseline UL 
% ∆ UL to 
Baseline Skewness Kurtosis 99.0% 99.5% 
99.9%  
(%∆ to Baseline)
M1a Homogeneous - No Rating 0.001% -13% 0.028% -6% 31.8 1405 0% 0% 0.53%  (-4%)
M1b Homogeneous - w/ Rating 0.002% -2% 0.035% 0% 22.2 619 0% 0% 0.63% (<1%)
M2 Firm fixed effects (σ2) 0.001% -4% 0.030% -2% 24.3 703 0% 0% 0.59  (<1%)
M3 Industry (σ2s) 0.006% -2% 0.062% 0% 12.9 192 0.15% 0.53% 0.88%  (<1%)
M4 Regional (σ2i) 0.022% -6% 0.117% -3% 6.7 59 0.59% 0.85% 1.23%  (-2%)
M0 Heterogeneous (σ2jis) 0.088% -7% 0.230% -4% 3.7 24 1.00% 1.28% 1.86%  (-4%)
 
Simulated one year ahead loss distributions for all return model specifications imposing an adverse shock to U.S. real output growth. 200,000 
simulations are used, and the same return default threshold, λ, by rating when rating information is used (this is the case for all models except M1a) is 
imposed. 
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Table 10 
Extreme Shocks to Real U.S. Equity Returns 
Statistics of Simulated Losses for Models M0 - M4, One Year Ahead, same λ 
 
Panel A: -5σ, Quarterly Decline of 30.6%      Value-at-Risk 
Model Specifications EL 
%∆ EL to 
Baseline UL 
% ∆ UL to 
Baseline Skewness Kurtosis 99.0% 99.5% 
99.9%  
(%∆ to Baseline)
M1a Homogeneous - No Rating 0.01% 794% 0.10% 244% 12.7 241 0.53% 0.64% 1.39%  (150%)
M1b Homogeneous - w/ Rating 0.02% 963% 0.13% 265% 8.8 116 0.64% 0.88% 1.47%  (135%)
M2 Firm fixed effects (σ2) 0.02% 1035% 0.11% 266% 8.8 113 0.62% 0.76% 1.22%  (107%)
M3 Industry (σ2s) 0.04% 588% 0.18% 192% 6.3 59 0.88% 1.08% 1.77%  (101%
M4 Regional (σ2i) 0.09% 275% 0.26% 113% 4.1 27 1.20% 1.43% 2.15% (72%)
M0 Heterogeneous (σ2jis) 0.24% 154% 0.44% 85% 3.1 19 1.98% 2.42% 3.53%  (83%)
         
Panel B: -8.02σ, Quarterly Decline of 49%      Value-at-Risk 
Model Specifications EL 
%∆ EL to 
Baseline UL 
% ∆ UL to 
Baseline Skewness Kurtosis 99.0% 99.5% 
99.9%  
(%∆ to Baseline)
M1a Homogeneous - No Rating 0.05% 3363% 0.23% 674% 8.5 119 1.17% 1.54% 2.72%  (390%)
M1b Homogeneous - w/ Rating 0.08% 3914% 0.28% 689% 5.7 57 1.29% 1.67% 2.79%  (347%)
M2 Firm fixed effects (σ2) 0.07% 4203% 0.24% 687% 5.7 55 1.08% 1.44% 2.36%  (302%)
M3 Industry (σ2s) 0.12% 1974% 0.35% 460% 4.4 32 1.63% 1.98% 3.07%  (249%)
M4 Regional (σ2i) 0.19% 714% 0.41% 242% 3.4 20 1.86% 2.24% 3.32%  (165%)
M0 Heterogeneous (σ2jis) 0.45% 382% 0.69% 187% 2.9 19 3.09% 3.74% 5.44%  (181%)
 
Simulated one year ahead loss distributions for all return model specifications imposing two more extreme adverse shocks to U.S. U.S. market equity 
returns . 200,000 simulations are used, and the same return default threshold, λ, by rating when rating information is used (this is the case for all 
models except M1a) is imposed. 
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Table 11 
Mean Group Estimates of Factor Loadings, Heterogeneous Model (M0b) 
Alternative specification 
 
Factors MGE 
βˆ  
S.E. of MGE 
( )ˆ. .s e β  
t-ratios 
constant 
1tq +∆  
, 1i tρ +∆  
1
o
tp +∆  
, 1i ty +∆  
0.010 
0.780 
-4.326 
0.041 
0.700 
0.003 
0.031 
0.520 
0.038 
0.260 
3.075 
24.874 
-6.923 
1.064 
2.695 
avg. 
2R  
avg. 
2R  
# of firm quarters 
0.157 
0.103 
17,114 
  
 
1tq +∆  is the cross-sectional average of all equity indices in the GVAR model using 1996 PPP 
weights, , 1i tρ +∆  is the change in the domestic interest rate, 1
o
tp +∆  is the change in oil prices and  
, 1i ty +∆  is the change in domestic real GDP. 
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Table 12 
Impact of Various 2.33σ Shocks to on Alternative Model 
Statistics of Simulated Losses, One Year Ahead, same λ 
 
       Value-at-Risk 
Scenario EL 
%∆ EL to 
Baseline UL 
% ∆ UL to 
Baseline Skewness Kurtosis 99.0% 99.5% 
99.9%  
(%∆ to Baseline)
Baseline 0.091% 0.208%  2.7 12 0.92% 1.00% 1.43% 
-2.33σ shock to U.S. real output growth 0.090% -1% 0.205% -2% 2.6 11 0.91% 0.97% 1.39%  (-3%) 
+2.33σ shock to German interest rates 0.097% 6% 0.215% 4% 2.7 12 0.94% 1.07% 1.52%  (6%) 
-2.33σ shock to U.S. equity returns 0.137% 51% 0.259% 25% 2.3 10 1.08% 1.26% 1.74%  (22%) 
+2.33σ shock to U.S. equity returns 0.066% -28% 0.176% -15% 3.1 15 0.79% 0.94% 1.28%  (-11%) 
 
Simulated one year ahead loss distributions using the alternative specification of the fully heterogeneous model M0, described in Section 6.4.  
Comparing loss distributions for the baseline scenario, adverse shocks to U.S. real output growth and German short maturity interest rates, and 
symmetric shocks to U.S. equity returns.  For all scenarios, 200,000 simulations are used, and the same return default threshold, λ, by rating when 
rating information is used (this is the case for all models except M1a) is imposed. 
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Table 13  
Impact of Granularity using Vasicek model 
 
 # of loans in portfolio (N) 
 119 243 1,000 5,000 10,000 
Deviation from asymptotic lower bound 80% 44% 12% 3% 2% 
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Figure 1: Scatter plot of unconditional (horizontal axis) and conditional (vertical axis) one-year probabilities of 
default (PD) for 243 firms in portfolio.  Top panel: same default threshold (λ) by credit rating for all firms.  Bottom 
panel: same distance to default (DD) by credit rating for all firms. 
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Figure 2: Comparing the tail of the baseline loss distributions across models, same λ identifying restriction by 
rating when rating information is used, 200,000 simulations.  Top panel: 20% tail (losses beyond the 80th 
percentile).  Bottom panel: 5% tail (losses beyond the 95th percentile).  Model M0 is fully heterogeneous model, M1a 
is homogenous (no rating information), M1b is homogeneous (with rating information), M2 is firm fixed effects, M3 
is industry fixed and marginal effects, and M4 is regional fixed and marginal effects. 
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Figure 3: Comparing simulated loss densities across different shocks to U.S. real equity prices, fully heterogeneous 
model M0 imposing the same default threshold λ identifying condition, 200,000 simulations.  All densities are 
estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel using Silverman’s (1986) optimal bandwidth. 
